

THE VOCATIONAL SOCIETY

by

KARIM LAHHAM

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the Creature in Christianity and Islam',
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T A B A H • F O U N D A T I O N

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IN THE NAME OF ALLAH,
MOST BENEFICENT, MOST MERCIFUL

IN ANY SOCIETY, the identification of the architecture of the social order is paramount to understanding and gauging the direction and values of that particular group. I do not mean here simply the science of sociology, as in the Comtian sense, but rather of an order that is informed by higher principles of moral theology essentially derived from and reposing in revelation. A man is, literally speaking, what he generally thinks himself to be. This almost imperceptible reflective process in traditional society is necessarily shaped and formed by the intellectual sciences that society espouses.

The conception of society for both Catholics and Muslims has historically been that of an organism, a living body composed of members or organs, each part being a complete whole,

and yet only when brought together do they ensure the necessary well-being of the entire body politic. This is witnessed by the formal organization of the guilds in the Middle Ages; artisans and craftsmen respectively pursuing the same vocation and coming together to promote the interests of their calling for the sake of the common good. Society here is a moral reality and not merely an accidental aggregation of persons. It engenders rights and duties on the individual, but its aim is the perfecting of the individual in accordance with his respective capacity (*isti'dad*). The type of individual spoken of here is the social individual who is the basis of the natural entity known as society. This individual, therefore, does not live for himself or work for himself, nor does he own property merely for himself. He does all this within the society he lives in, that is to say his or her individual purpose is qualified by a social direction, ultimately formed and shaped by revelation.

This view is in sharp contrast to that of the modern condition, in which the individual will has been championed above that of the social will, seen as a fetter on individual liberty and freedom. I do not want to digress at this stage into a discussion of the distinction between

freedom and license, but suffice it to say that the rush towards the destruction of institutions of society such as the natural association of family, together with the belittlement of the integrity of marriage, is a concomitant of this attitude. One cannot help thinking that the current loosening of the cohesion of society and the inevitable consequent moral degradation plays a significant role in enabling or facilitating commercial and political exploitation. The futility of such a view of opposing wills, however, where the social will supplants the individual will, is a misunderstanding of the natural hierarchical orders, leading to the rather bleak reality of the modern individual clinging to his rights by his fingernails whilst facing the raw power of state authority, isolated and helpless.

In the Islamic or Catholic order, freedom can only be manifested via social discipline under which each person is enabled to express their own individuality by exercising the function appropriate to them in the organic hierarchy of nature. The social will, therefore, in a traditional scheme does not supplant or absorb the individual will but complements it, directs it, and supports it, just as the individual is by the family, and the family and its property

formerly by the guild, and the guild by the state. Each institution successively and precisely is limited by what cannot be accomplished by its predecessors. This is the principle of subsidiarity championed by Pius XI in the 1930s,¹ and a ubiquitous reality adhered to throughout history in Islamic societies.

I would like to first set out the background for the exposition of the vocational society in the setting of the traditional city, followed by a brief examination of the tenets of the Islamic social structure, and then conclude with a juxtaposition of some aspects of the writings of two notable Austrian Catholic writers with some examples from the Ottoman social structure.

THE TRADITIONAL CITY AND THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY

It is contended that by taking the city as a foundational grid of a society, in which the multifarious aspects of human interaction and creativity are encapsulated, the relation between belief or thought and structure can be adequately portrayed.² That is to say that the built environment is always an expression or crystallization of the belief and world-view of its inhabitants. It is further contended

that the pre-industrial models reveal a balance and harmony with the natural world that the machine world has displaced, a harmony whose principle resides essentially in a spiritual reality.

The pre-industrial city implies a city that precedes the onset of modernity and the application of the new imperatives introduced during the Renaissance through the displacement of the measure of God for the measure of man. Modernity, for the purpose of this project, is understood as the discontinuity of attaching truth-values to a changing standard; a flux, determined by a social and political voluntarism shorn from any reliance on first principles. The city is primarily a conscious work of art that does not merely entail a superficial aestheticism, or a style, but incorporates the spiritual affiliations and creed of its artisans. It is the reflection of the commonwealth that inhabits it.

The French historian Jules Michelet reflected the 'disenchantment' of mainstream scholars with the medieval world in 1855, when he referred to the Renaissance as 'the discovery of the world and the discovery of man'.³ His words re-echoed the views of the Italian humanists such as Filippo Villani (1325–1405) and Leonardo Bruni (1369–1444), namely that

the shortcomings of the Medieval Age lay in its fettering of creativity and freedom due to the stranglehold of the Church and its interminable scholasticism. What distinguished the humanist viewpoint was not so much their discovery of antiquity, since Aristotle and Plato were already well known to the Middle Ages, but that they had taken a detached view of antiquity vis-à-vis themselves and had begun to have a sense of distance between themselves and the past.⁴

This historicization of consciousness is the notable break with the notion of tradition. Their main criticism was interestingly in the domain of literature and philology, seeing the beginnings of literary revival only in the arrival of Petrarch (1304–1374).⁵ Although the humanist criticism remained on the level of style and technique, the Enlightenment philosophes sought to establish such deficiencies in the epistemologies espoused by the scholastics.⁶ The new creature born of this awakening and summary condemnation of seven centuries of history was the individual.⁷

The juxtaposition of the singularity of the individual with that of the perfect whole of the commonwealth, the foundation of the city model, spelt the decline of the city idea in modern Europe. The unit of society heretofore

had always been the family and the clan, but this did not entail a lack of recognition of the individual. Feudal obligations were naturally personal and reciprocal, but above all the medieval conception of salvation centered on the individual soul. The rise of the modern individual was a tacit recognition of the self as detached from the inter-relationships that in the end defined him and gave him his function. It is hard not to conclude, therefore, that such a detachment rendered the individual ultimately meaningless, because his definition was no longer related to anything intelligible and objective. The change in outlook emanating from this state of affairs, however, is not merely philosophical but also theological.⁸

The rise of the individual as an idea is premised on the notion of personal autonomy. This is based on an independent morality and its expression as the principle of the inviolability of the human person. This inviolability gives rise in turn to rights and reciprocal rights together with counterpart duties. In this scheme freedom becomes a cause and an end, order being defined as the respect of freedom. Every free act thus becomes a moral act, and every act of obedience becomes a limitation of freedom. However, as any society by necessity must be based on the

notion of law for any order to subsist, and since law is based in turn on obligation, it is difficult to see how the independent moralist can become anything other than anti-social. Man cannot be a law unto himself because every time he acts against a self-imposed law, as he must do since any self-imposition can only be expedient, he in effect destroys it. If this is the case, then the independent moralist cannot do as he likes. If so, then he in effect places reason as a fetter on his feelings, and subordinates his will to it. On what basis, therefore, does he then retain independence, and on what basis does he grant superiority of reason over will?

The rise of the natural sciences in tandem with a rejection of metaphysics, from which they ostensibly derived their first principles, rendered them ethically directionless and intellectually flawed.⁹ By principle is meant not merely the post-Kantian concept of a regulative idea, laws arrived at through a generalization of certain inductive results, but rather that from which something proceeds, or that which retains its ontological status as the starting point of being or knowledge. A principle is also a proposition that is self-evidently true presenting no prior premises from which it can be deduced. A first principle consequently is a

principle that does not proceed from a prior principle in its own series, as God is the first principle of Being. By ontological is meant that which pertains to being, or that which is real as contrasted with the mental or cerebral.

Following on from this, if everything should be studied instrumentally, as the social sciences are disposed to do,¹⁰ then it follows logically and correlatively that everything would also have to be considered of the same nature as the objects of the natural sciences. This is obviously and palpably not the case, and illustrates the real limitations of such an overtly materialist approach. This can be seen in the idea of cosmos, for example, which has been monopolized by natural scientists to mean the physical and horizontal structure of the universe rather than the totality of the various orders of Being and their relationships. The traditional view has consistently held that man in his contingency stands in a particular organic relationship to the world he inhabits.¹¹ This 'situating' of man in more inclusive unities does not mean that his personality is violated or belittled, but rather contextualized as part of a wider order; and if contextualized, then ordered in accordance with function and scale. His contingency, here, imposes a necessary relation of total

subjection to God. This subjection means that the commands of God are laws to be observed, creating obligations for man to fulfill. These laws are for the governance of behaviour for the common good. Society is that which arises from this governance.

THE BASIS OF THE ISLAMIC SOCIAL STRUCTURE

The sources dealing with occupations and social stratification in Islamic history are varied and extensive. These range from *hisba* manuals¹² to literary treatises¹³ dealing with the administration of the crafts and their social and spiritual benefit. The *hisba* manuals appear as early as the ninth century when other juridical manuals begin to appear and correspondingly at first comprise collections of fatwas, later developing into professional manuals for craftsmen and tradesmen. The word *hisba*¹⁴ represents the Qur'anic principle espoused by Muslims of commanding the right and forbidding the wrong (*al-amr bi'l-ma'ruf wa'l-nahy 'an al-munkar*).¹⁵ The Prophet (Allah bless him and give him peace) in an important hadith places the modes of application of this principle within a clear hierarchy.

Whosoever of you sees evil action, let him change it with his hand; and if he is not able to do so, then with his tongue; and if he is not able to do so, then with his heart—and that is the weakest of faith.¹⁶

Despite the clarity of the modes of application, there remained much debate amongst the ulema (religious scholars) as to the determination of the scope of the obligation. Was it the obligation of a specific person (i.e. by the appointment of a *muhtasib*¹⁷) who was entrusted with this duty on behalf of the community, supervising moral behaviour in the market places together with the quality of work in the craft workshops, or was the obligation to perform this duty binding on each and every individual? This debate began to be largely active, although not exclusively so, around the time when the Abbasid caliph al-Ma'mun (813–833) institutionalized the practice and issued a ban on private individuals enacting the duty.¹⁸ On the whole the institution of *hisba* was accepted as binding on the community rather than the individual, with the noted exception of Imam al-Ghazali (d. 505/1111). This is not to say that he advocated a vigilante attitude to public morality, but rather that his stance served

to stress that official appointees should not monopolize the exercise of such an important religious duty. The layman, therefore, was not to engage in *hisba* except in the most obvious cases where an offence would be a clear proscribed act for the offender in question. Such intervention was to be undertaken within strict parameters. The intervener must further be legally competent, a Muslim, and able to perform the task in hand. This is in line with the notion that one is intervening to safeguard a right of God and not merely to secure a personal advantage.¹⁹ In such cases where the matter is deemed to be within the domain of scholarly judgment (*ijtihad*), the layman has no right to perform the duty and must defer to the scholar in line with the third stated condition of competence.²⁰ The whole notion of *hisba* can only be contextualized within the broader social bond that the religion enjoins, namely that of brotherhood.

The notion of brotherhood subsists as the overriding principle of social cohesion in the Islamic social fabric. The unity of the Islamic polity (*umma*) is manifested in the principle of one community and one nation, premised by the Qur'anic directive that all Muslims are brothers in Sura al-Hujurat 10:

The believers are indeed brothers; so make peace between your brethren and observe your duty to God that haply ye may obtain mercy.

This unity is expressed as a religious and political unity (*fi'l-din wa'l-wilayat*).²¹ In Sura Al 'Imran 103, we are told:

And hold fast to God's bond, together, and do not separate; remember God's favour unto you; how ye were enemies and He brought your hearts together, so that by His grace you became brothers.

Again in Sura al-Mu'minun 52, we are told:

Surely this community of yours is one community, and I am your Lord; so fear Me.

The contract of brotherhood, here, confers on each party, according to al-Ghazali in his *Ihya' 'ulum al-din*, a proprietary right over the other as well as rights in personam, tongue, and heart. He lists eight duties; namely material assistance, personal aid, holding one's tongue, speaking out, forgiveness, prayer, loyalty and sincerity, and finally informality.²² These duties of fellowship are set out as the external

manifestations of the inner worship of God, and in themselves are depicted as the highest service to God. The virtue of good character that these duties engender is of paramount importance in abiding by the Prophetic model.

Moral theology in essence is the science of acts, which in the Islamic classification of the sciences is the purview of the science of jurisprudence or *fiqh*. It is the function of the *fiqh* scholars to subject human behaviour to the ethical and legal norms derived from revelation as society necessitates justice and, therefore, the rule of law.²³ The theologian or *mutakallim*'s responsibility on the other hand is to examine the person's power and capacity to act. The role of the *fiqh* scholars in other words is not restricted to the provision of legal rules, but moreover to discuss and elaborate legal and ethical implications of principles derived from revelation, and then to apply the derived norms for human acts in society. The so-called legal scholars (*fuqaha'*) are not, therefore, the juridical and pharisaical figures the Orientalists depict but rather those who address the innermost conscience of the Muslim believer.

In the Ottoman Empire, the caliph who was sultan and successor to the Prophet's temporal powers was the political and military chief

of the Muslim community.²⁴ His political decisions nevertheless needed to take into consideration the views of the foremost *faqih* in the Empire, the Grand Mufti. The presence and stature of the latter was oftentimes a check or restraint on the sultan's more outlandish decision-making. Moreover, any attempt to remove an intransigent mufti invariably risked igniting a popular revolt and was not easily contemplated.²⁵

The individual addressed and taught by the *fiqh* the norms of social interaction and moral acts became, thus, a part of a larger polity bound by the brotherhood of belief. The image or analogy most often used to describe the individual is as a microcosm (*al-insan al-saghir*) of the Universe, in turn understood as the Makranthropos (*al-insan al-kabir*). Just as in creation there are hierarchies of order, these same vertical stratifications were necessarily recapitulated in man. Al-Ghazali reaffirms this when he states that man was created small in size but significant in meaning.²⁶ The various faculties of man according to him can also be seen to correspond to the external social order so that the intellect of man is akin to the Amir, the body is as the city, the senses as soldiers under the command of the Amir, the body

parts as his subjects, the lower self as the enemy within the fortress (*ribat*) of the body and the soul garrisoned as the *murabit*. The spiritual warfare envisioned here is that of the greater jihad. The lesser jihad, fighting to safeguard the faith against military attack, is regarded in this scheme as necessary but inferior to the greater jihad in accordance with the saying attributed to the Prophet when returning from the field of battle, 'We have returned from the lesser struggle to face the greater struggle'. When the Prophet (Allah bless him and give him peace) was once asked what is the preferred jihad, he replied, 'The struggle against one's own self.'²⁷

The spiritual struggle is thus the overriding engagement of the Muslim in the World, a venture that must imbue every aspect of the social order. If we glance at the pre-modern Islamic city, and examine the vocations, trades, or professions espoused by the inhabitants as expressions of acts necessitated in the ordinary course of daily life, we find that the final end of all this activity is prefigured by the spiritual directive to overcome the self, to seek one's perfection and closeness to God rather than simply worldly gain. All is seemingly dragooned or drafted to the struggle for spiritual contentment. The crafts and trades are

thus seen as spiritual opportunities rather than merely liabilities. According to al-Ghazali, it is God who creates the aptitudes in men for the differing crafts and trades, making those that take up each craft not interchangeable with one another; the very well ordering of society is thus predicated on the application of each man to his craft.²⁸ The corollary is that an interchangeable and unskilled proletariat, undisciplined by a craft, can be said to be ungodly and therefore liable to bring disorder to society.

The exercise of skill was thought of as a distinguishing honour. The nobility attached to the crafts can be clearly seen at the highest levels of Ottoman society, for every sultan invariably had to master a craft despite the lofty position he held. The exercise of handwork was never therefore looked down upon. Mehmed I made bow strings; Mehmed II was an experienced gardener and horticulturalist; Selim I and Suleyman I were goldsmiths; Selim II made crescents for pilgrims' staffs; Murad II was an arrowsmith; Mehmed III and Ahmed I made spoons and archers' thumb-rings; Mehmed IV was a poet and even wrote his military dispatches in verse; and lastly, Abdulhamid II was a furniture-maker who even furnished his own palace at Yildiz.²⁹

IT IS IMPORTANT to recapitulate that the social body of a traditional society is a living organism, where the individual's vocational activity in effect establishes him as an organic part of it. The organization of the social body corresponds, therefore, necessarily to the vocational activities of its members. These vocational activities were traditionally organized in corporative associations usually identified as guilds or self-regulating vocational orders.

If one can characterize the current liberal economic order as guided by the performance principle of liberal competition, under which the individual must naturally struggle for his social position by his attainments in the market place or otherwise risk losing it, then one can safely say that the corporative society has a different understanding of performance; one that is not premised on the volume of what is performed but rather the nature and type of work undertaken. Although the former understanding is generally par the course in the atomist individualist social order, each member in the traditional order is largely assured a place within the vocational order, even were he to be found wanting or inefficient (within moral bounds). In such a situation the whole body is

entrusted with the alleviation demanded until the member is able to function fully again. The difference between this order and, for example, the trade union is that the latter is an agenda-driven private body narrowly focussed on the central wage relationship between labour and management, whilst the former serves as an inalienable organic part of a living structure. The role of the individual guild member is thus not interchangeable. The relationship of these vocational groups within the state is therefore one of autarchy, with a significant enhancement of the principle of subsidiarity.

THE TRADITIONAL OR PRE-MODERN CITY

The social order within the city encompasses the interaction of spiritual authority with the temporal order in the context of urban administration.

The traditional view defines the fundamental unit of society as being the family, and this generally holds as the basis of its relation with the wider commonwealth. It also proceeds to distinguish the fundamental unit of the family—the individual—for the sake of spiritual responsibility. When the individual is elevated by modern political philosophy above the community or the family, it becomes,

as alluded to above, an expression of the reductionism of spiritual categories to political and social ends. The displacement of the family in the name of the individual, as the residual social entity possessing rights, is a clear example of this.

This spiritual goal necessarily determines the social goal, and therefore the social order, since the final end of man determines his material or efficient ends. The social order in turn organizes the dissemination of the intellectual sciences, the activities of trade, and in itself reflects the political philosophy of the inhabitants. So in assessing the central internal functions of a city such as Istanbul, reflecting the external ones above, one can state them as being the office of the judge (*qadi*), the guilds and spiritual confraternities, and the office of the market inspector (*muhtasib*).

The functioning of society in a traditional city such as the imperial city of Istanbul was imbued with the principle of subsidiarity. The urban administration in such a state, therefore, resided for the most part by way of regulation of the guilds. Each trade possessed its guild and its quarters within the city, and each guild possessed its monopoly on membership, their standards required for the manufacture or sale

of a product. For example, the stone carvers were often to be sited at or very near the city walls, such as Damascus, in case their services became a necessity during an emergency. Other trades such as the dyers would also be at the extremities of the city due to the nuisance of their activities. This positioning was reflected in the nature of the city structure.³⁰

In seventeenth-century Istanbul, by way of example, the corporations or guilds (*esnaf*) were naturally self-regulating, but nevertheless subject to an administrative matrix when it came to giving effect to their rules. Evliya Celebi, the celebrated traveller of the early seventeenth century, recounts the existence of 1001 guilds in Istanbul divided into 57 groups.³¹ He also provides evidence to show that the entire population of the city with the exception of the military and foreign residents, who also had their own organization, were guild members. The administration of each guild is described as being overseen by two officers, the *kethuda* or *kahya* (the steward) and the *yigit bashi* (chief fellow), together with a council of elders or veterans of the guild acting like trustees, known as the *ihitiariye*. The steward dealt with relations with the government, and had to have his decisions ratified by the *qadi*.

A case in point might be when a member was found to have acted dishonestly in asking an excessive price or in tampering with the weights and measures. The guild administrators in such a case would not have the power to directly prosecute the offender despite their responsibility to inspect the particular *suqs* in question; instead, the offending member would be reported to the *muhtasib* and the *qadi*, the latter adjudicating and deciding what sanction is to be applied by the office of the *muhtasib*. The most benign sentence for such an offence was the *bastonnade*, always meted out in public and invariably outside the perpetrator's place of business.³² In severe cases, the member might be imprisoned by the *qadi* or even expelled from the guild by the shaykh of the order.³³

The individual entering a guild did not merely enter a trade union where he was apprenticed and taught his craft, but rather a social matrix of identity. It determined his mode of education, where he lived, worked, and often even what he wore. He was moreover able to rely on the guild for spiritual and significant material support. Each guild operated a fund for this purpose referred to in Istanbul as *taavun sandigi*.³⁴ This essentially operated as a *waqf* (religious endowment) for members in distress

or in need, and funded religious festivals such as *mawlid*s and free distribution of food to the poorer members of society.

The close relationship of the spiritual confraternities with the trade guilds transformed the market place into an opportunity for the effective support of the spiritual life.³⁵ Primarily, the guilds operated on the basis of the just price, and subsequently one found shops selling the same types of products grouped together. The art of trade was a communal one, where members supported one another. The spirit of *futuwwa*, or chivalry, which pervaded the market place, evidences this. By way of illustration, a new member in the market place would be welcomed by established traders in the same product, and would be supported often by the deliberate diversion of their own clientèle for the benefit of the newcomer. This would often continue until the new member had established himself whereupon he would be expected to do the same to any subsequent member.³⁶

It should be noted that this system operated well into the early twentieth century in much of the Near East. It is notable that the vicissitudes of political change and upheaval had very little impact on the everyday reality of

life, interwoven as it was by guild hierarchies. The individual member of society was socially rooted and ensconced in such a way that the long arm of the government could not easily traverse the gauntlet of institutional intermediaries to reach him.³⁷

Despite the brief nature of the above discussion, I believe there is much here that satisfies the aspirations of two main thinkers that had a great effect on the sustainability of the *Gemeinschaft* society in nineteenth-century Europe and whose ideas became incorporated into the encyclicals *Rerum Novarum* (1891) and *Quadragesimo Anno* (1931), through figures such as the Marquis de la Tour Du Pin and Albert de Mun. The two figures are respectively Adam Müller (1779–1829) and Karl Vogelsang (1818–1890). Müller studied theology and jurisprudence and political science at Gottingen, and was a close confidant of Prince Klemens von Metternich.³⁸ He was also and foremost a radical critic of Adam Smith's individualistic conception of economics, the idea of pure income, the privatization of all occupations in place of family and corporative right, and the notion of absolute property (appropriated from Roman law). He held real property as not private property but that to be

held in trust for the community. In as far as his economic teachings were concerned he saw the individualistic tone of Smith as an incitement to and expression of self-love or solipsism. Müller proposed the idea of interconnection and unification of all social elements, that is to say the economic, the political, the religious, and the moral, similar to what Islamic societies implemented. If Smith abstracts economics as a discrete discipline to examine in isolation, Müller demands a reintegration of the spiritual and the social. He described this mutual interpenetration in the following way:

The soundness of our ancestors' view of the essence of political life (a view that was not distorted by any intrusive theory) is shown by this, that, despite all the sub-division of urban industry, they did everything they could to ensure its vigorous unification. The arts and the sciences became severed one from another, but only insofar as they respectively entered into the close corporations of the guilds. The more the functions of an urban handicraft were assigned to a number of different hands, the more energetically did the master recollect the scattered threads into a whole; but he himself, the master, stood once more as a journeyman, as an individual worker within the body of

the guild; the individual guild, again, entered into a sort of marriage with the corporation of urban industry; urban industry, too, strove to achieve a mutual interpenetration with rural production, represented by the nobility and landed gentry; and even though the supreme relationship of economic mutuality in the State was never wholly and perfectly achieved, we nevertheless find all economic functions tending in this one particular direction.³⁹

Smith's glorification of competition is juxtaposed with the personal interdependence of all the members of the community.

The spirit reacts unceasingly against the division and mechanisation of labour, which Adam Smith prized so highly; the spirit wants to preserve man's personality.⁴⁰

And again:

There is no separate occupation in bourgeois society...for whose sake...a man should forget his own self.⁴¹

Müller's economic structure comprised four primary factors of production.⁴² Land, which represents the factor of permanence; labour,

which represents mobility or development; concrete capital and spiritual capital, which unite the first two factors, sometimes inhibiting, sometimes quickening, production. These four factors correspond to the four elements of the family; youth (representing forward aspiration) is concrete capital which leads to the mercantile estate; age (inhibition) embodied in spiritual capital leads to the clergy and the teaching profession; virility (production) is conformable to labour leading to estate of burghers; femininity (conservation), which is conformable to the productive nature leading to the nobility and gentry. Thus in turn are the four factors related to the four fundamental ideas of the State. The embodiment of Müller's idea was the corporative society that ensured the social and spiritual reciprocity that he had in mind of what was referred to by Joseph Vialatoux as an *economia perennis*.⁴³

The Christian socialist Karl Baron von Vogelsang is registered by history as having paved the way for the Christian Socialist party of Austria famously led by his successor Karl Lueger.⁴⁴ He more importantly, however, advocated that the foundations of Catholic social thought must be love, justice, and solidarity. He averred that this could only be

accomplished by a return to the hierarchical structures of medieval society as much as possible with modifications to account for modern exigencies. All artisans and craftsmen, therefore, were to be compulsorily incorporated into a guild in order to safeguard quality and an effective commercial regimen. The destruction of the guilds in Austria in 1859 due to Josephinist ideas had led to economic chaos and widespread unemployment. Although the reversion to a guild system did succeed in limited terms a few years later under Vogelsang's influence, the industrial die had been economically cast.

Following Adam Müller's four elements, and given the modern forms of enterprise, Vogelsang nevertheless advocated that every firm in commercial practice should become an industrial family in which workers and owners shared the responsibility of management. Each industrial family in turn would belong to a regional family known as the branch corporation consisting of all the firms in the area. These branch delegations would send delegates to the industrial chamber, where economic policy would be decided for each respective industry.⁴⁵ This parliament of functionalist representation rather than merely regional representation was one that operated

and continued to operate widely in the Islamic world in the governance of the traditional city structure.

CONCLUSION

This brief exploration of a symbiotic Catholic–Muslim understanding of social philosophy within each respective faith serves to illustrate the possibilities for convergence in securing the common good in the public space. All too often the relationship of religion to the modern world is encompassed as being one of ideological competition. The idea that religion should occupy the same framework as ideology is detrimental, however, for the task that religion must set itself in cultural reconstruction. Given that such an enterprise will require a re-emergence of a social philosophy anchored primarily in metaphysics, it is important that this is distinguished from the pragmatic roots of ideology.

In the context of the acute problems of today's social ills, one can conclude that when the structure of a society, the social order, no longer reflected the eternal verities formerly adhered to, it can only be a matter of time before those verities become irrelevant and forgotten. The efforts referred to above for a revival of

the corporative society are a significant step towards the safeguarding of the traditional social order, as well as the definition of the human scale, a step that can be a guiding light for present generations from both faiths seeking to establish the imprint of their religious values in the socio-political realm.

ENDNOTES

¹ For a Catholic definition of this principle see the publication released by the Pontifical Council for Justice & Peace *Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church* (London: Burns & Oates, 2005), 93–95.

² 'The city, as one finds it in history, is the point of maximum concentration for the power and culture of a community. It is the place where the diffused rays of many separate beams of life fall into focus, with gains in both social effectiveness and significance. The city is the form and symbol of an integrated social relationship: it is the seat of the temple, the market, the hall of justice, the academy of learning.' Lewis Mumford, *The Culture of Cities* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1940), 3.

³ 'Ces esprits trop prévenus ont seulement oublié deux choses, petites en effet, qui appartiennent à cet âge plus qu'à tous ses prédécesseurs: la découverte du monde, la découverte de l'homme.' See Jules Michelet, *Histoire de France au seizième siècle: Renaissance*, vol. 7 (Paris: Cham-erot, 1855), ii.

⁴ See Eugenio Garin, *Italian Humanism: Philosophy and Civic Life in the Renaissance* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1965), 14–15.

⁵ In 1436 Bruni wrote his *Life of Petrarch*, in which he states: 'Petrarch was the first man to have had a sufficiently fine mind to recognize the gracefulness of the lost ancient style and to bring it back to life.' See Garin, *ibid*, 18.

⁶ For example, see Voltaire's *Essai sur les mœurs et l'esprit des nations*, Tomes 21–27 (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2009). See especially Tome 24, Chapters 81–82.

⁷ Richard Devane, *The Failure of Individualism* (Dublin: Browne and Nolan, 1948).

⁸ 'A society penetrated throughout ... by the ideas and teaching of a dogmatic religion will continue essentially unchanged so long as no change occurs in the religion on which it is based. In order, therefore, to effect any far-reaching social change in such a society, it is necessary to attack the religion in which it is rooted; and conversely, any attack on the religion entails, as a necessary consequence, serious social and economic changes.' George O'Brien, *An Essay on the Economic Effects of the Reformation* (London: Burns Oates & Washbourne, 1923), 9.

⁹ On the myth of metaphysical neutrality, see Ruth Groff, *Ontology Revisited: Metaphysics in Social and Political Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 2013).

¹⁰ See, for example, the method of concomitant variations as 'the instrument par excellence' of sociological research in Émile Durkheim, *The Rules of Sociological Method* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1938), 132–136.

¹¹ This 'organicism' is the main theme of Lewis Mumford's *The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, and Its Prospects* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1961).

¹² Such as the ninth-century *Ahkam al-suq*, written by the Cordoban Yahya ibn 'Umar, and the twelfth-century *Kitab nihayat al-rutba fi talab al-hisba* by al-Shayzari, a

contemporary of Saladin. See Maya Shatzmiller, *Labour in the Medieval Islamic World* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994), 71, 74; also, Ahmad Ghabin, *Hisba, Arts and Craft in Islam* (Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz Verlag, 2009), 161–166.

¹³ Examples of these include the twelfth-century literary anthology by al-Raghib al-Isfahani *Muhadarat al-udaba'* (Cairo: Matba'at al-Hilal, 1902), and that of the fourteenth-century Shafi'i *qadi* Taj al-Din al-Subki, *Kitab mu'id al-ni'am wa-mubid al-niqam* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Khanji, 1948).

¹⁴ The word is derived from the infinitive *h-s-b*, which also furnishes the basis for the words *hasaba* (to calculate), *ihtisab* (seeking reward), and *muhtasib* (the one who undertakes the obligation, individually or institutionally).

¹⁵ See Q3:104; Q3:110; Q3:114; Q7:157; Q9:71; Q9:112; Q22:41; Q31:17. For an analysis of these verses and the principle itself see M. A. Cook, *Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 13–31.

¹⁶ This hadith is related in *Sahih Muslim*, and is included in Imam al-Nawawi's collection *al-Arba'in al-Nawawiyya*, edited & translated by Ezzedin Ibrahim & Denys Johnson-Davis as *An-Nawawi's Forty Hadith* (Damascus: The Holy Koran Publishing House, 2nd Edition, 1977), 110–111.34.

¹⁷ On the history of this institution and the function of the *muhtasib*, see R. P. Buckley, 'The Muhtasib', *Arabica*, vol. 39 (1992): 59–117.

¹⁸ Ahmed Abdelsalam, 'The Practice of Violence in the *Hisba*-Theories', *Iranian Studies*, vol. 38:4 (2005): 547–554.

¹⁹ M. A. Cook, *ibid*, 437. For an analysis of al-Ghazali's views on individual obligation see Chapter 16.

²⁰ Ibid, 436.

²¹ See Abu Muhammad al-Husayn bin Mas'ud al-Baghawi, *Tafsir al-Baghawi Ma'alim al-tanzil*, 8 vols., eds. Muhammad 'Abdullah al-Nimr, 'Uthman Jumu'a al-Damiriyya, Sulayman Musallam al-Harsh (Riyadh: Dar Tayba, 1409AH/1988CE), 7:341.

²² See Book XV of Abu Hamid al-Ghazali's *Ihya' 'ulum al-din*, 4 vols. (Cairo: Dar al-Sha'b, n.d.), 1:5-6, 2:924-1036. For the translation of the headings cited, I have used the partial translation by Muhtar Holland, *On the Duties of Brotherhood* (London: Latimer New Dimensions Ltd., 1975).

²³ Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, *Mizan al-'amal*, edited by Sulayman Dunya (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif, 1961), 359.

²⁴ See Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire 1300-1650: The Structure of Power* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 116-127; also, Hamilton A.R. Gibb, 'Lutfi Pasa on the Ottoman Caliphate', *Oriens* 15 (1962): 287-295.

²⁵ On these relationships, see Emile Tyan, *Institutions du Droit Public Musulman* (Paris: Recueil Sirey, cop. 1954), and R.C. Repp, *The Mufti of Istanbul: a Study in the Development of the Ottoman Learned Hierarchy* (London: Ithaca Press, 1986).

²⁶ Al-Ghazali, *Mizan al-'amal*, 238.

²⁷ Ibid, 239. Although this hadith may be disputed in some quarters due to an uncertainty in the chain of narration, its reality and meaning nevertheless is unanimously upheld.

²⁸ Ibid, 360-361.

²⁹ See Raphaela Lewis, *Everyday Life in Ottoman Turkey* (London: B.T. Batsford, 1971), 141. As for Abdulhamid II, his furniture remains in use to this day and may be seen at Yildiz.

³⁰ For the relationship of craft activity to city lay-out see André Raymond, 'The Spatial Organization of the City', in Jayyusi et al., *The City in the Islamic World*, vols. 1–2, (Leiden: Brill HdO, 2008), 47–70. See also his 'The Economy of the Traditional City', in Jayyusi et al., *ibid*, 731–751.

³¹ Gabriel Baer, 'Guilds in Middle Eastern History', in M.A. Cook (ed.), *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 18.

³² Robert Mantran, *Istanbul dans la moitié du XVIII^{ème} siècle* (Paris: Librairie Adrien Maisonneuve, 1962), 383–384.

³³ *Ibid*, 384.

³⁴ *Ibid*, 379.

³⁵ This is precisely the theme of Taj al-Din al-Subki's treatise *Mu'id al-ni'am*, where the jurist takes the professions and portrays how they each can be lived in propriety and as a means to channel spiritual virtues. See above n. 13.

³⁶ Mantran, *Istanbul dans la moitié du XVIII^{ème} siècle*, 384–389.

³⁷ This has been argued and demonstrated most lucidly by Marshall Hodgson in *The Venture of Islam*, vol. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), where he discusses the liberties (and challenges) entailed by the social order and cultural patterning of what he terms medieval Islam's 'Sunni internationalism'.

³⁸ His two main books were *Elemente der Staatskunst* (Berlin: J.D. Sander, 1809), and *Versuche einer neuen Theorie des Geldes mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Grossbritannien* (Leipzig: Altenburg, 1816; new edition edited by Helene Lieser, Jena: Verlag von Gustav Fischer, 1922).

³⁹ See Müller, *Versuche einer neuen Theorie des Geldes* (Lieser edition, 1922), 37. This passage translated and

quoted in Othmar Spann, *The History of Economics*, translated by Eden and Cedar Paul (New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 1930), 161.

⁴⁰ Spann, *ibid*, 162.

⁴¹ *Ibid*, 162.

⁴² *Ibid*, 165–166.

⁴³ See Joseph Vialatoux, *Philosophie Économique: Études critiques sur le naturalisme* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer et Cie, 1932).

⁴⁴ See Alfred Diamant, *Austrian Catholics and the First Republic: Democracy, Capitalism, and the Social Order 1918–1934* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), 140–148.

⁴⁵ For a précis of Vogelsang's ideas see the extracts translated into French in Vogelsang, *Morale et Economie Sociales*, 3rd edition (Paris: Librairie Bloud & Cie, 1908).

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